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Abstract
Movements in countries’ exchange rates can substantially change the prices of goods 
faced by producers and consumers and thereby affect incentives to produce, consume, 
and trade goods. Exchange rate changes, however, might not be completely transmitted 
(passed through) to domestic prices. Empirical evidence shows that price and exchange 
rate transmission for agricultural products is low in most developing economies, partly 
because of trade policies but also because of inadequate infrastructure and other market 
deficiencies. During the last 20 years, developed and developing countries generally 
have moved away from support policies that impede price and exchange rate transmis-
sion toward trade policies that allow transmission, such as tariffs. The Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture of 1994 strongly encouraged this development. Despite 
these policy changes, market deficiencies remain as a cause of incomplete transmission. 
Incomplete transmission weakens countries’ integration into world agricultural markets 
and thereby reduces agricultural trade potential. Low transmission in developing coun-
tries also decreases their own benefits from trade, including the gains they could realize  
if there is further global agricultural liberalization.
Keywords: Agricultural infrastructure, agricultural policy, agricultural trade, exchange 
rates, exchange rate transmission, imperfect markets, institutions, price transmission.
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Summary
Exchange rate movements can change countries’ domestic prices, thereby 
affecting incentives to produce, consume, and trade goods. For example, 
consider an exporting country that has a depreciating currency. The price 
domestic producers receive for exporting a good should rise because the 
trade price converted into domestic currency is now higher. This beneﬁ  ts 
domestic producers and motivates them to produce and export more 
of the good.
However, many countries have trade policies or market conditions that 
prevent or reduce the transmission (or pass through) of changes in exchange 
rates to domestic prices. This blunts the domestic price and market response 
to exchange rate changes. In the example above, incomplete transmission 
could keep the domestic price, production, and export of the good from rising 
as much as possible. Incomplete transmission thereby can prevent countries 
from attaining the levels of production, consumption, and trade of goods that 
would bring them, and their trading partners, the most economic beneﬁ  t.
What Is the Issue?
The main reason exchange rate transmission is important for U.S. agriculture 
is because a large share of U.S. agricultural production is exported. Over 
the last 15 years, about a quarter of U.S. agricultural output has been sold 
abroad. Incomplete transmission of agricultural prices and exchange rates to 
domestic prices within countries means, however, that these countries are not 
fully integrated into world agricultural markets. They are not trading as much 
as they proﬁ  tably could. More speciﬁ  cally, as a group they are not importing 
as many agricultural goods from the United States as is in their, and the 
United States, economic interests.
What Did the Study Find?
The two main causes of incomplete exchange rate transmission for agricul-
tural products are trade policies and poor market conditions. Trade policies 
that impede transmission include import quotas and systems of managed 
(or ﬁ  xed) agricultural prices. Poor market conditions can involve deﬁ  cient 
market infrastructure and the use of market power by large buyers and sellers 
to set prices. The deﬁ  ciencies can be in physical infrastructure, such as roads, 
transport, and storage, or in commercial and institutional infrastructure, 
such as systems of market information, ﬁ  nance, and law. Poor infrastructure 
isolates regional markets within countries from each other, as well as cuts 
them off from the world market, thus weakening transmission.
The United States has been moving away from transmission-impeding agri-
cultural trade and support policies, it has fairly good infrastructure supporting 
the agro-food economy, and its agricultural markets are reasonably competi-
tive. Thus, price and exchange rate transmission is not a serious problem for 
the workings of U.S. agriculture. Empirical research shows, however, that 
price and exchange rate transmission for agricultural products is lower in 
developing economies than in the United States and other developed coun-
tries. Analysis of 56 developing countries over a 30-year period found that iv 
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about a third of the countries had almost no transmission of border price 
changes to domestic prices, even after allowing for an adjustment period 
of 5-7 years. In 23 other countries, after 5 years, no more than half of the 
change in border prices was transmitted to domestic prices.
Policies within developing economies certainly account for some of the 
weak transmission. Yet, during the last 20 years, many developing countries 
have liberalized their agricultural policies, a process promoted by the 1994 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, such that price and exchange 
rate transmission should improve. However, poor market conditions, such as 
weak infrastructure, continue as a serious impediment to price and exchange 
rate transmission in many developing economies.
Incomplete transmission has implications for the interpretation and use of 
standard measures of agricultural protection and support. These measures all 
involve some sort of gap between the domestic price for a commodity and 
its border price. This price wedge is typically interpreted as a measure of the 
degree to which government policies distort domestic prices, and thereby 
distort market incentives to produce, consume, and trade goods. However, 
measures of protection and support could be used to misidentify the cause of 
price gaps. This could happen if a large part of the price wedges were caused 
not by policies but by incomplete price and exchange rate transmission 
resulting from market imperfections, such as deficient infrastructure.  
By misidentifying the cause of price gaps, governments might adopt inappro-
priate policies intended to eliminate the gaps.
How Was the Study Conducted?
The study uses market and trade analysis to examine how changes in 
exchange rates affect a country’s domestic markets for agricultural commodi-
ties. The same conceptual framework is then used to analyze the causes 
and market effects of incomplete price and exchange rate transmission for 
agricultural commodities. The study also examines the empirical evidence 
concerning exchange rate transmission for the United States, other developed 
countries, and, particularly, developing countries, as well as evidence that 
market conditions alone can cause incomplete transmission.1 
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Introduction
Foreign exchange markets link a country’s domestic economy to world 
product markets by facilitating the conversion of foreign currencies into 
domestic currency. The degree to which exchange rate changes impact a 
country’s domestic markets depends on the extent to which the changes are 
transmitted, or passed through, to domestic prices. When only part of an 
exchange rate change is transmitted to domestic prices (called incomplete 
transmission), domestic prices will differ from border prices. Such price 
differences indicate that countries are not maximizing their total volume of 
trade, and, thereby, their potential economic gains from trade. This, in turn, 
means that the countries’ total economic welfare is less than it could be.
If countries fail to maximize their trade volumes and gains from trade, not 
only is their economic welfare reduced, but so, too, are the trade and welfare 
gains of their trading partners. The United States is the largest agricultural 
exporter in the world, with 2007 exports equaling $90 billion (10 percent of 
the world total; FASonline). About 25 percent of U.S. agricultural output 
is exported. Incomplete transmission for agricultural products that reduces 
countries’ trade therefore hurts the United States as the world’s leading agri-
cultural exporter. 
This report examines the possible causes and economic effects of incomplete 
exchange rate transmission. It looks at the empirical record concerning the 
magnitude of exchange rate transmission in countries throughout the world, 
with special focus on developing economies. The report also examines 
how incomplete transmission can lead to misinterpretation of conventional 
measures of agricultural protection and support, as the measures might over-
state the importance of policies as causes of price gaps. This misidentifica-
tion could motivate governments to make inappropriate policy changes in an 
effort to end the price gaps.2 
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Why Are Exchange Rates  
Important for Agriculture?
Exchange rates are a key variable in determining domestic prices for agricul-
tural commodities, and, thus, the quantities of goods domestically produced, 
consumed, and traded. For tradable goods, exchange rates link domestic 
prices to world prices. If a country imposes no transmission-impeding poli-
cies and there are no domestic transport or transaction costs for a tradable 
product, the domestic price for a good (Pd) is determined by the world price 
(Pw) times the exchange rate (E), that is, Pd  =  Pw * E.
Figure 1 demonstrates how changes in the exchange rate can affect the 
market for a U.S. agricultural commodity. Assume in the figure that the 
world price equals 50 euros and the dollar/euro exchange rate equals 2 
(which means it takes 2 dollars to buy 1 euro). The commodity’s domestic 
price equals $100 (P2). At this price, Q2 of the commodity is domestically 
produced, Q5 purchased, and Q2Q5 imported. Assume now that the exchange 
rate falls from 2 to 1 (E2 to E1), meaning that now only 1 dollar is needed 
to buy 1 euro. (This means that the dollar has doubled in value vis-à-vis the 
euro, or alternatively, appreciated by 100 percent.) Because it now takes only 
half as many dollars as before to buy a given amount of euros, the dollar’s 
appreciation lowers the domestic price of all tradable goods initially priced 
in euros. In this example, the domestic price is halved from $100 to $50 (P1). 
At the lower price, domestic production falls to Q1, purchases rise to Q6, and 
imports increase to Q1Q6.
Alternatively, assume that the exchange rate rises from 2 dollars per euro 
to 3 dollars per euro (a depreciation of 50 percent). Because it now takes 50 
percent more dollars to buy a given amount of euros as before, the dollar’s 
depreciation raises the domestic price of all tradable goods initially priced in 
euros. In this example, the domestic price increases from $100 to $150 (P3). 
At the higher price, domestic production rises to Q3, consumption falls to Q4, 
and imports decrease to Q3Q4.
An increase in the world price of the good in question from $100 to $150 
would have the same initial market effect as the 50-percent depreciation in 
the dollar. Exchange rates, however, have more potential than world prices 
to affect domestic markets. The change in the world price for a specific 
commodity mainly will impact the domestic price for that good alone (with 
lesser effects on the prices of a few related goods), while a change in a coun-
try’s exchange rate can alter domestic prices for all tradable goods.1 The 
price changes for other tradable goods can, in turn, affect the market for the 
good in question (in figure 1, assume this good is beef). The depreciation of 
the currency as represented by the rise in the domestic beef price from $100 
to $150 will raise the domestic price of all domestically produced substi-
tutes for beef, such as pork and poultry. The price increases for those goods 
will boost demand for beef to some degree through a consumer substitution 
effect, shifting the demand curve for beef to the right. This shift will offset 
some of the drop in quantity demanded for beef from the initial rise in its 
price from $100 to $150. The currency depreciation will also increase the 
prices for all tradable inputs used to produce beef. This effect will shift  
the domestic supply curve for beef to the left, reducing output and  
increasing imports.
1One might counter that the currency 
of a country has no single exchange 
rate but rather a separate rate vis-à-vis 
the currency of every other country. 
Although this is technically correct, 
countries’ exchange rates tend to move 
together vis-à-vis those of most other 
foreign currencies. If the rates did not 
move in such a way, currency traders 
could make large profits by combining 
trades in the currencies against which 
a country’s exchange rate did change 
with trades in the currencies against 
which the country’s currency did not 
change (called arbitrage).3 
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By affecting prices for all tradable goods, changes in exchange rates have 
secondary market effects for a single good beyond that identified in figure 1. 
Thus, exchange rate changes have a more complex effect on the market for 
an individual good than does a change in the world price for that good alone.
Exchange rates can have large swings in magnitude, which also makes them 
important for agricultural markets (fig. 2). Although the currencies of devel-
oping economies are characterized by such swings, developed economies’ 
currencies also can change substantially in value over time, as shown by the 
fluctuation in the value of the U.S. dollar and euro over the last 35 years.2 For 
most countries, exchange rates fluctuate not so much through annual move-
ments in value up and down but rather through movement over multiyear 
cycles. The major changes in exchange rates over the course of these multiyear 
2The euro did not officially come into 
existence until 1999 (electronically at 
first, with notes and coins coming in 
2002). The euro exchange rate in figure 
2 is calculated by using trade weights 
to convert earlier currency values for 
the 12 future member countries to a 
euro equivalent.
Figure 1
Domestic market effects of exchange rate changes                                                                   
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cycles can alter domestic prices substantially. For example, from 1993 to 
1999, the dollar appreciated by about 10 percent vis-à-vis all other currencies 
in trade-weighted terms. Over that time, the U.S. farm gate price for wheat, 
soybeans, beef cattle, and hogs fell 24, 28, 14, and 33 percent, respectively 
(USDA, ERS, Agricultural Outlook). Although other market conditions prob-
ably contributed to these large price drops, the currency appreciation appears to 
have played a key role.5 
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What Is Exchange Rate Transmission?
As discussed in the previous section, if a country imposes no transmission-
impeding policies on a commodity and there are no domestic transport or 
transaction costs for the product, the domestic price for the good (Pd) will 
be determined by the world price (Pw) times the exchange rate (E), that is, 
Pd  =  Pw * E. Pw * E gives the commodity price in domestic currency at the 
border and therefore is called the border price (Pb). If Pd  =  Pb  =  Pw * E, 
the border price has been completely transmitted, or passed through, to the 
domestic price. Alternatively, one could say that both the world price and 
exchange rate have been completely transmitted to Pd. Although the words 
transmission and pass through often are used to describe the process by 
which changes in border prices affect domestic prices, the rest of this paper 
will use the word transmission exclusively.
Another test of transmission is the degree to which a change in Pb, Pw, or E 
is transmitted to Pd. The test involves computing transmission elasticities. 
The transmission elasticity (TE) involving Pb and Pd is defined as the percent 
change in Pd divided by the percent change in Pb, that is, %∆Pd / %∆Pb. If 
the TE equals 1, there is complete transmission of the change in Pb to Pd. If 
the TE equals 0, there is no transmission, and if the TE is between 0 and 1, 
the transmission is incomplete. One can also compute transmission elastici-
ties specifically for the relationships between the world price or exchange 
rate and the domestic price. The exchange rate transmission elasticity equals 
%∆Pd / %∆E and also can be between 0 and 1.
In figure 1, assume that, initially, Pd = Pb = $50, such that Pw * E = 50 * 1. 
E then rises from 1 to 3, such that Pb increases from $50 to $150. If Pd also 
were to rise to $150, the TE involving E and Pd (as well as the TE involving 
Pb and Pd) would equal 200% / 200% = 1. The transmission of the change in 
the exchange rate to the domestic price would be complete. If Pd were not to 
change at all, the TE would equal 0. If Pd were to rise to $100, the TE would 
equal 100% / 200% = 0.5.
Because changes in both exchange rates and world prices can be transmitted 
to domestic prices, many of the issues discussed in this report involving 
exchange rate transmission apply also to world price transmission. This 
report focuses on exchange rate transmission because of the high degree to 
which exchange rates can fluctuate, especially for developing countries, and 
because a change in the exchange rate for a country’s currency can affect 
domestic prices for all its tradable goods.6
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What Are the Possible Causes of Incomplete 
Exchange Rate Transmission?
This section of the report is a conceptual discussion of the two general causes 
of incomplete exchange rate transmission: government policies and market 
conditions. Another section of the report, “What Is the Empirical Evidence 
Concerning Exchange Rate Transmission?” examines more deeply the preva-
lence of the specific policies and market conditions throughout the world that 
impede transmission.
Government Policies
During the post-World War II period, governments throughout the world 
(including in the United States and European Union (EU)) have maintained 
various policies for agricultural commodities that largely precluded trans-
mission (table 1). These policies usually involved either explicitly fixing 
prices or defending targeted prices through government intervention into 
agricultural markets (say, by purchasing output). In the United States, such 
managed price policies have included the commodity loan program (used 
for wheat, corn, soybeans, and cotton, among other crops), the sugar price 
support program, and the dairy support program (see USDA, ERS, Farm and 
Commodity Policy Briefing Room).
During the same period, the most common EU transmission-impeding policy 
was intervention prices, combined with variable levies. In 1992, the EU 
reduced intervention prices, and in 1994, it abolished variable levies as part 
of the Uruguay Round (UR) Agreement on Agriculture. Nonetheless, the 
intervention price system combined with border measures still remains for 
certain commodities, such as milling wheat, barley, sugar, and dairy prod-
ucts, insulating domestic agricultural producer prices from changes in border 
prices (Agra Europe).
Trade quotas also prevent price or exchange rate transmission. In figure 1, 
assume that an import quota of Q3Q4 exists. The quota volume, combined 
with the shapes of the domestic demand and supply curves, determines the 
domestic price (P3), and, thereby, the quantity of the good domestically 
produced (Q3) and consumed (Q4). Assume that the border price also initially 
Table 1





Tariffs Prevent if trade prohibitive
Tariff rate quotas Prevent if quota is operative
Technical barriers to trade/ Prevent if take form of trade bans
sanitary and phytosanitary
  Source:  USDA, Economic Research Service.7 
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equals P3 but then falls to P2. If the quota volume remains unchanged, the 
domestic price will also remain unchanged at P3.3 Consequently, none of the 
drop in the border price will be transmitted to the domestic price.
Another government policy that can prevent transmission is state trading. 
State trading exists when a state or parastatal agency determines the volume 
of a commodity that a country will export or import (see Ackerman and 
Dixit, 1999). Examples of state trading agencies include the Canadian 
Wheat Board, AWB of Australia, and Fonterra of New Zealand for agri-
cultural exports, and the Staple Food Department of the Japanese Ministry 
of Agriculture and Korea Agro-Fishery Trade Corporation for agricultural 
imports. (AWB formerly was the Australian Wheat Board, whereas Fonterra 
was formed from the merger of the New Zealand Dairy Board, New Zealand 
Dairy Group, and Kiwi Cooperative Dairies. Although privatized a few years 
ago, these agencies operate like state traders.)  State trading agencies on the 
import side determine the volume of a commodity to be imported, and that 
volume functions like a trade quota. Just as import quotas insulate domestic 
prices from border prices, so, too, does import state trading in its most typical 
forms. Consequently, certain state trading practices also can prevent world 
price and exchange rate transmission to domestic prices.
The trade policy that most allows transmission is tariffs. This is especially 
true of ad valorem tariffs, where the tariff is calculated as a percentage of the 
border price. Given that the tariff charge is a proportion of the border price, 
any percent change in the border price (or more specifically, world price 
or exchange rate) can result in an identical percent change in the domestic 
price (assuming no domestic transport or transaction costs for the imported 
product). Thus, the transmission elasticity potentially is 100 percent. Tariffs, 
however, can be trade prohibitive, that is, so high that they discourage any 
trade whatsoever. By effectively cutting off domestic markets from world 
markets, prohibitive tariffs also prevent world price and exchange rate  
transmission to domestic prices.4
A policy related to tariffs that might or might not impede transmission 
is tariff rate quotas (TRQs). A TRQ is a two-tiered tariff, where a lower 
in-quota tariff is applied to a maximum volume of initial imports and a 
higher over-quota tariff is applied to all additional imports (see Skully, 
2001). Because TRQs combine elements of a pure tariff and a pure quota, the 
degree to which they allow price and exchange rate transmission depends on 
whether the tariff or quota part of the TRQ is operative.
Another major type of trade restriction is technical barriers to trade (TBTs), 
defined to include sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures. Roberts et al. 
(1999) argue that the two most common TBT measures are regulations and 
testing requirements, both of which increase the cost to foreign suppliers 
of providing goods for import by the TBT-imposing country. These costs 
simply increase the price of traded goods and thereby do not retard the trans-
mission of changes in either the world price or the exchange rate to domestic 
prices. TBTs, however, can take the form of a complete ban on imports, 
typically because the exporting country suppliers do not satisfy the imposed 
regulation or testing requirement. By completely preventing trade, trade bans 
block any transmission between world prices or exchange rates from the 
banned country to the domestic market of the banning country. 
3To see this, assume that the drop in 
the border price to P2 also initially re-
sults in the domestic price falling to P2.  
At this price, consumers would want to 
import Q2Q5 of the good. The quota, 
however, restricts imports to only 
Q3Q4. To eliminate the excess demand 
for imports, the domestic price must 
return to P3, at which price consumer 
demand for imports equals the import 
volume allowed by the quota.
4The other main type of tariff is a 
fixed charge per unit of good imported 
or exported. With a per unit tariff, the 
transmission elasticity between the 
border and domestic prices will not 
equal 100 percent. For example, as-
sume that the border price for an import 
is $100 and a per unit tariff of $25 
exists. This will produce a domestic 
price of $125. Assume now that the 
border price doubles to $200, such that 
the domestic price rises to $225 (adding 
on the per unit tariff). The border price 
has increased by 100 percent, but the 
domestic price has risen by only 80 
percent. The transmission elasticity is 
therefore 80 percent / 100 percent = 
0.8. Note, however, that the full $100 
increase in the border price is passed 
on to the domestic price, which rises 
from $125 to $225. An ad valorem 
tariff creates a transmission elasticity 
of 100 percent because the domestic 
price changes proportionally with the 
border price. A fixed per unit tariff, 
on the other hand, does not produce a 
transmission elasticity of 100 percent 
because the fixed tariff precludes a 
proportional relationship between the 
border and domestic prices.8
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During the last 20 years, countries throughout the world have been moving 
away from trade policies that prevent or lower price and exchange rate trans-
mission toward policies that allow it, especially tariffs. The United States and 
the EU have been reducing managed price policies that can wholly preclude 
transmission (USDA, ERS, Farm and Commodity Policy Brieﬁ  ng Room; 
Agra Europe). These countries have moved to some degree to agricultural 
support policies based on direct payments to farmers. Under these policies, 
farmers receive direct monetary payments from the government largely inde-
pendent of (decoupled from) prices and production decisions. Consequently, 
the payments should not much affect agricultural markets or prevent or 
reduce the transmission of border price changes to domestic prices. Yet, both 
the United States and the EU retain policies that impede price transmission, 
such as the U.S sugar price support program.
Before the late 1980s, the governments of most developing countries strongly 
regulated and controlled their agricultural economies, in particular, prices 
and trade volumes. These policies also largely insulated domestic prices 
from border prices. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, developing 
countries began to liberalize their agricultural policies so that their domestic 
agricultural markets became more integrated into world markets (see WTO). 
The effect has been to strengthen transmission between border and domestic 
prices. Developed and developing economies were motivated to liberalize 
their agricultural policies by the 1994 UR Agreement on Agriculture, which 
banned import quotas, nontariff measures maintained through state trading 
enterprises, and most other nontariff trade barriers, requiring countries to 
convert border measures to tariffs.5
In the 1980s, the countries with the strictest agricultural trade controls were 
the planned economies of the Soviet bloc. These economies kept domestic 
prices almost completely insulated from world prices and exchange rates so 
that no transmission from the latter to the former was possible. The collapse 
of the Soviet Union and Soviet bloc and the transition of the former bloc 
countries from planned to market economies that began in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s allowed for their expanding integration into world markets 
so that price and exchange rate transmission for agricultural products now 
became possible (see Liefert and Swinnen, 2002).
Although there has been a general worldwide move during the last two 
decades away from transmission-retarding policies—and, especially, such 
policies as managed prices and quotas that wholly preclude transmission—
prohibitive tariffs, TRQs, and TBTs have expanded as trade restrictions 
during this time. As discussed earlier, these policies can also prevent trans-
mission, which means their growing prevalence has mitigated the move from 
transmission-retarding trade measures.
Market Conditions
The move from policies that impede transmission enhances the importance 
of the second main cause of incomplete exchange rate transmission—market 
conditions, which can be divided into two subcategories: market power and 
deﬁ  cient market infrastructure. Market power exists when certain buyers or 
sellers of a product are so “big” that they are responsible for a large share of 
the product’s market transactions. Because of their inﬂ  uence on the market, 
5The actual trade-liberalizing effect 
of the Uruguay Round Agreement, and, 
especially, tarifﬁ  cation, was in fact 
rather limited, at least in the short to 
medium term. Countries were given the 
power to determine tariff rate equiva-
lents for their own nontariff measures, 
with little outside scrutiny or challenge. 
Many of the new tariffs appear to have 
been higher than that yielded by a more 
objective calculation (Josling et al., 
1996). Yet, at least the principle of tarif-
ﬁ  cation was accepted and implemented.9 
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these agents do not have to accept the prices at which products are exchanged. 
Rather, their “market power” gives them the ability to determine to some 
degree the prices at which they buy and sell, that is, they are “price makers” 
rather than “price takers.” This power to set prices can interfere with the trans-
mission of changes in world prices and exchange rates to domestic prices.
Market power can impede exchange rate transmission when exporters engage 
in “pricing to market” behavior. For example, assume that the currency of 
the exporting country depreciates by 50 percent vis-à-vis the currency of 
the importing country. If the exchange rate change were fully transmitted, 
importers would pay 50 percent less for commodities purchased from the 
exporter, all other things equal. However, the exchange rate change might 
not be fully transmitted because the exporters might exercise market power 
to increase their markups in response to the exchange rate depreciation. In 
this case, importers would receive only some, but not all, of the benefit of the 
depreciation of the exporter’s currency due to incomplete transmission.
Market power also can affect exchange rate transmission when it is held by 
economic agents within a country’s domestic agro-food chain. In many coun-
tries, food processors and wholesalers have market power vis-à-vis the farms 
from which they purchase primary output. Assume that a country’s currency 
depreciates vis-à-vis all foreign currencies, which should increase domestic 
prices for all tradable agricultural products. Wholesalers and processors 
might use their market power to reduce the degree to which they pass on the 
price increases that they receive to their farm suppliers.
The other category of market condition that can reduce world price and 
exchange rate transmission is deficient physical, commercial, and institu-
tional infrastructure for the agro-food economy. Developing and transition 
economies, in particular, can suffer from poor agricultural infrastructure. 
Undeveloped physical infrastructure involves such deficiencies as weak 
roads, transport, and storage. Poor commercial and institutional infrastruc-
ture involves such deficiencies as weak systems of market information, 
finance, and law, the latter failing to enforce contracts and protect property. 
Corruption by public officials can also be considered part of weak institu-
tional infrastructure, if the political and legal systems cannot adequately 
police and discipline such behavior. 
Deficient infrastructure can have two main effects, both of which can impact 
exchange rate transmission. First, it can result in high internal transport 
and transaction costs for agricultural and food products. As stated earlier, if 
countries impose no transmission-retarding policies and there are no internal 
transport or transaction costs for moving goods, border prices will determine 
domestic prices for tradable goods. Most imported or exported products, 
however, require some transportation between the domestic site of produc-
tion or consumption and the border (typically a port). Consequently, even in 
well-developed market economies, the domestic movement of tradable goods 
involves some transport and transaction costs. If market infrastructure is 
weak, however, such costs can be high, especially for perishable products. In 
some African countries, for example, trucking agricultural goods 100 miles 
might take almost a week and involve large expenses for documentation, 
tolls, and other taxes (often indistinguishable from bribes). Domestic trans-
port and transaction costs could in fact be so high for certain goods that they 10 
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wholly preclude trade (which will occur if these costs exceed the initial gap 
between the goods’ border and domestic prices).
Fackler and Goodwin (2001) discuss the importance of transport and trans-
action costs for agricultural markets and trade, while Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2004) do so for trade in general. Anderson and van Wincoop 
identify four ways in which trade frictions can create transaction costs: (1) 
language barriers; (2) currency barriers; (3) information barriers; and (4) 
contracting costs and insecurity.
For an imported product, domestic transport and transaction costs (TT) 
increase the price domestic producers receive relative to the border price; 
that is, Pd = Pb + TT = Pw * E + TT (assuming that no policies raise Pd above 
Pb, such as a tariff). TT acts as a form of import protection for domestically 
produced output. For an exported product, TT decreases the price domestic 
producers can receive relative to the border price, that is, Pd = Pb – TT = Pw* 
E – TT. In this case, TT acts like an export tax, as it cuts into the export price 
(Pb) that domestic producers would receive.
TT affects the transmission of changes in world prices and the exchange 
rate to domestic prices because a strictly proportional relationship does not 
exist between the former and the latter. For imports, the existence of TT 
results in Pd > Pb. Assuming no change in TT, a given percent change in Pb 
will generate a smaller percent change in Pd. As a result, the transmission 
elasticity between Pb and Pd (or, alternatively, between either Pw or E and 
Pd) will be less than one. For exports, the opposite is true. The existence of 
TT now results in Pd < Pb. A given percent change in Pb will therefore result 
in a larger percent change in Pd. Consequently, the transmission elasticity 
between Pb and Pd (or between either Pw or E and Pd) will be greater  
than one.
The second main effect of deficient market infrastructure is that it can create 
the market imperfection of incomplete information. In particular, producers 
in isolated areas might be unaware of prices (and, especially, price move-
ments) at the border or in the domestic markets where their output competes 
with imports. Isolated producers often have to make commercial commit-
ments before the final transaction prices in distant markets are known. 
Deficient infrastructure also creates market rigidities and holdup problems, 
such as delayed payments to farms, which reduce prices (especially when 
inflation is high; see Gow and Swinnen, 1998). Two of the causes of transac-
tion costs in international trade identified by Anderson and van Wincoop—
information barriers and contracting costs and insecurity—can also impede 
the flow of market information and activity. Barrett (2001) and Barrett and Li 
(2002) discuss how poor infrastructure can create imperfect information and 
related imperfections for agricultural markets and argue that the consequence 
can be price disequilibrium that lasts for extended periods of time.
Deficient market information resulting from weak infrastructure can segment 
regional markets within countries from each other, as well as cut off these 
regional markets from the world market. Consequently, the transmission 
of changes in world prices and exchange rates to domestic agricultural 
producers might be low. If incomplete transmission exists because of imper-
fect information, then it will be the case for an imported product that Pd  =  11 
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Pb + TT + G (again assuming no market intervention policy), and for an 
export that Pd  =  Pb – TT – G, where G is a gap between the border and 
domestic price that does not result from measurable transport and transaction 
costs. Barrett and Li describe the existence of G as market disequilibrium, 
or, alternatively, imperfect integration of the domestic market into the world 
market. This price gap contributes to incomplete exchange rate transmission 
not simply for the technical reason that the relationship between Pb and Pd is 
no longer strictly proportional. Rather, the price gap results because deficient 
infrastructure fundamentally disrupts the flow of information concerning 
price movements and commercial opportunities between domestic markets 
and world markets.
Deficient market infrastructure can result in both high TT and the transmis-
sion-impeding weak flow of market information, and related market rigidi-
ties, within countries. A tradeoff could in fact exist between the two effects 
for individual commodities. If border prices exceed the prices received by 
domestic farmers, the farmers have strong incentive to export, even if the 
transport and transaction costs of moving product from the farm to the border 
are high. The more product that is exported, the more domestic markets 
will be integrated into world markets, and the stronger will be the informa-
tion flow between the world and domestic markets. Yet, the actions taken 
to strengthen market integration in this way, especially if made quickly, can 
raise the TT of exporting, which cuts into the price farmers  
can receive for exporting vis-à-vis the border price.
A relationship also can exist between deficient market infrastructure and 
market power. Wholesalers and processors, who tend to be larger and more 
“concentrated” than farmers, probably have better market information than 
the farmers as well. They can use this superior information in negotiating to 
gain power over their primary output suppliers.
The degree of transmission for a good also is typically related to how 
intensively a country trades it. The greater the share of exports in domestic 
production, or the share of imports in consumption, the closer the relation-
ship between the border and domestic price is likely to be. In addition, many 
primary agricultural goods are used as inputs by the food processing industry 
to prepare final products for retail sale. Generally speaking, the greater 
(lower) the share of a primary good in the total value added of the final 
product, the higher (lower) the transmission between the border price for the 
final product and the domestic price for the primary good. 12 
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What Are the Economic Effects of  
Incomplete Transmission?
By weakening the relationship between world prices/exchange rates and 
domestic prices, incomplete transmission can strongly affect countries’ 
markets for tradable goods. Figure 3 can be used to examine how incomplete 
transmission impacts agricultural markets, in this specific case, the market 
for a single imported product. Special focus will be on how the incomplete 
transmission affects the economic welfare of producers and consumers.
Assume that the domestic and border prices for a commodity are initially 
equal at P3. Q3 of the good is domestically produced, Q4 purchased and 
consumed, and Q3Q4 imported. The country’s currency then appreciates 
against the currencies of all countries that export this commodity, such that 
the border price falls to P1. Assume, however, that because of the weak flow 
of market information resulting from deficient infrastructure, the drop in the 
border price is incompletely transmitted to the domestic price, so that the 
latter decreases to only P2.
In this example, the incomplete transmission hurts domestic consumers 
and helps producers. Because of the incomplete transmission, consumers’ 
purchase of the good increases to only Q5 rather than Q6, and they also pay a 
higher price of P2, compared with P1. Producers, on the other hand, produce 
more of the good (Q2 rather than Q1) and receive a higher price (P2 rather 
than P1).6
Another effect of the incomplete transmission is that only Q2Q5 of the good 
is imported, rather than Q1Q6. The incomplete transmission also has one 
other welfare effect. Because the border price P1 now lies below the domestic 
price P2, traders can purchase the import at the border at the lower price and 
6The price elasticity of supply of 
the good with respect to the border 
price will equal the price transmis-
sion elasticity between the border 
and domestic price, times the price 
elasticity of supply with respect to the 
domestic price, that is, %∆Q / %∆Pb =   
(%∆Pd / %∆Pb) * (%∆Q / %∆Pd).  In 
this example, the incomplete transmis-
sion between the border and domestic 
prices results in more of the good being 
produced (Q1Q2) than would be if 
transmission were complete.
Figure 3
Effect of incomplete transmission on a single market:  the import case                                                                   
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then sell it to consumers at the higher domestic price. The profit from this 
price arbitrage (buying low and selling high) per unit sold is P1P2, and the 
total profit (or welfare gain) to the traders equals HBFJ. This gain to the arbi-
trage traders comes directly at the expense of consumers.
The concepts of consumer and producer surplus can be used to determine 
the net effect of these welfare changes. Consumer surplus is the difference 
between the maximum amount consumers are willing to pay to purchase a 
given quantity of a good and the amount they actually do pay. It therefore is 
the measure of consumers’ net welfare gain from purchasing and consuming 
goods. Consumer surplus equals the area below the demand curve and above 
the horizontal line anchored at the domestic market price. If the price fell 
from P3 to P1, consumer surplus would rise by the area P1P3EG. Because of 
the incomplete transmission, consumer surplus increases by only P2P3EF. 
The incomplete transmission deprives consumers of P1P2FG of additional 
welfare gain from the price drop.
Producer surplus is the difference between the minimum revenue producers 
are willing to accept to produce a given quantity of output and the amount 
of revenue they actually do receive. It therefore measures producers’ net 
welfare gain from producing and selling goods. Producer surplus equals the 
area above the supply curve and below the horizontal line anchored at the 
market price.7 If the price fell from P3 to P1, producer surplus would decline 
by P1P3CA. Because of the incomplete transmission, producer surplus 
decreases by only P2P3CB. The incomplete transmission saves producers 
from losing an additional P1P2BA of revenue, or welfare.
What is the net welfare effect of the incomplete transmission? The incom-
plete transmission deprives consumers of P1P2FG of additional welfare gain, 
while it saves producers P1P2BA of welfare loss. It also allows the arbitrage 
traders to earn HBFJ of profit. The net effect is therefore a welfare loss to the 
economy equal to the two triangles ABH and FGJ.
One might wonder why market forces would not eliminate the gap between 
the border and domestic prices, with the profit earned by the arbitrage traders 
in particular being a lure to lower the price gap. In a competitive market, as 
information flows over time, the gap likely would lower (weak infrastructure 
notwithstanding). For this reason, price and exchange rate transmission for 
many real-world commodity/country pairings is lower in the short run than 
in the long run. Incomplete price transmission resulting from weak market 
infrastructure is therefore a more serious problem for the short- to midterm 
than for the long run.
It might also appear odd in this example that both the domestic producer and 
consumer price for an agricultural good would be substantially above the 
border price throughout the country. If incomplete transmission results from 
poor market infrastructure, a more likely situation is that the infrastructure 
would segment the domestic market into regional markets. Those regional 
markets that are more distant from the border or have poorer infrastructure 
would be more isolated and have lower transmission and larger price gaps. 
The situation examined in this example could therefore apply to a regional 
market for a commodity within a large country.8
7A benefit of the concepts of con-
sumer and producer surplus is that they 
allow a single quantitative measure to 
capture both the price and quantity ef-
fects on consumers and producers from 
market changes.
8Supplying regional markets that 
have poor market infrastructure with 
imports could involve high transport 
and transaction costs. The market 
analysis would have to be adjusted to 
account for these costs. The arbitrage 
traders would have to bear these costs, 
though they might be able to pass them 
on to consumers by raising the price at 
which they sell the imports. Probably 
the best way to adjust the analysis is 
with the border price, where the ad-
justed border price equals the arbitrage 
traders’ full per unit cost of supplying 
the regional market with imports. This 
full price equals the good’s actual bor-
der price plus the per unit transport and 
transaction costs of moving the product 
from the border to the regional market. 
The arbitragers’ per unit profit would 
therefore equal Pd – Pb – TT.14 
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The analysis of the market and welfare effects from incomplete transmission 
when a good is exported is similar to that for an imported good. Assume that 
the domestic and border prices for an export are initially equal, the border 
price then rises, but, because of incomplete transmission, the domestic 
producer and consumer price increases less. The incomplete transmission 
now hurts producers because the price rises less than the maximum possible 
and they produce less than they would at the higher price. Consumers benefit, 
however, because they pay less and purchase more of the good than they 
would if the price rose as high as the border price. As in the import case, 
arbitrage traders will also gain from the incomplete transmission. They can 
purchase the good from domestic producers at the low domestic price and 
then export it at the higher border price. The arbitrage profit per unit bought 
and sold will again equal the difference between the domestic and border 
price.
As opposed to the import case, in the export case the quantity domestically 
produced is greater than the quantity domestically consumed. As a result, 
the producers’ loss exceeds not only the consumers’ gain but the gain to the 
consumers and arbitrage traders combined. As in the import case, however, 
the incomplete transmission again results in a net welfare loss to the 
economy.
Another possibility is that a change in the trade price for a good or the 
exchange rate is asymmetrically transmitted to a country’s domestic 
producers and consumers of the product. For example, a country imports a 
good and its trade price rises. The price increase is fully transmitted to the 
price faced by domestic consumers of the product, but little if any is trans-
mitted to the price faced by domestic producers. This effect might stem 
from consumers being concentrated in large cities, which typically have 
good physical and commercial infrastructure for bringing in imported goods. 
Many countries’ big cities are in fact coastal ports, such that the transmis-
sion of border prices for imports to consumer prices is very high (or more 
specifically, transmission is high for that share of the total value of final retail 
products contributed by the imports). On the other hand, many domestic 
producers of imported agricultural goods might be in the remote hinterland, 
which has poor infrastructure, such that transmission of border prices to the 
prices they face is low. In the example above, the country’s consumers of 
the imported product would suffer from the price increase, while the low 
transmission to the producers’ price provides little countervailing benefit to 
domestic producers from the price increase.
This analysis shows that the specific market and welfare effects for 
producers, consumers, and traders from incomplete transmission depend 
on whether a good is imported or exported, whether its price increases or 
decreases, and whether the transmission to domestic producer and consumer 
prices is symmetric. Yet, in most cases, incomplete transmission will result 
in a net welfare loss for a country.15 
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What Is the Empirical Evidence Concerning 
Exchange Rate Transmission?
Although a substantial amount of empirical work has been done estimating 
the transmission between agricultural world prices and countries’ domestic 
prices, only a few studies have isolated the impact of exchange rates on 
domestic prices. Consequently, this section presents results from work on 
world price transmission to gauge the magnitude of exchange rate transmis-
sion. In general, this is legitimate. As discussed earlier, the world price for 
a good and exchange rate together determine the good’s border price in 
domestic currency, which is then transmitted to domestic prices. Thus, the 
transmission of change in either the world price or exchange rate affects 
domestic prices through the same policies, market institutions, and distribu-
tion systems. World prices and exchange rates in most cases should therefore 
have fairly equal transmission elasticities.9 Some studies, in fact, compute 
transmission between border prices, which cover both world prices and 
exchange rates, and domestic prices. In discussing specific empirical studies, 
this report will identify whether transmission is computed for world prices, 
exchange rates, or border prices.
Another issue is how one assesses the magnitude of transmission estimates 
from specific studies. What constitutes high, low, or moderate transmission? 
A complicating factor is that studies can differ in their country coverage, 
time coverage, methodology of estimation, and data used. Even if two works 
cover the same countries and time period, they can use different methods and 
data in their estimation. Disparities in the transmission estimates between 
studies might therefore reflect these differences, rather than the underlying 
conditions (policies, market power, quality of infrastructure) that can  
affect transmission.
Most individual studies that estimate transmission elasticities for multiple 
countries use the same methodology and period of estimation, and often the 
same data source. To control for these factors, the main approach here in 
assessing the magnitude (and especially relative magnitude) of transmission 
elasticities is to compare results for different countries within the same study. 
Yet, a certain transmission elasticity estimate, say 0.5, might be judged  
relatively high within one study and relatively low within another.
Two other more technical points also should be considered in assessing the 
transmission elasticities. First, if transport and transaction costs (TT) exist 
that are fixed rather than proportional to the border price, the transmission 
elasticity between the border and domestic price for a good will not equal 
unity. This will be the case even if there are no policy or market impediments 
to transmission. If the good in question is imported, the fixed nature of TT 
will result in a transmission elasticity less than one; if the good is exported, 
the transmission elasticity will be greater than one. Some studies try to adjust 
for this problem by measuring and deducting TT, such that any difference 
between the border and domestic price does not reflect TT. Even so, error in 
measuring TT might not wholly eliminate this problem.
9The main exception to transmis-
sion equivalence for world prices and 
exchange rates stems from the role 
of expectations about the duration of 
changes in these values. For example, 
if the markets believe that the change in 
a price for a certain good or exchange 
rate will be very short run, and that the 
price or exchange rate will soon revert 
to its previous value, domestic prices 
might not react much to the change.16 
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Second, if the gap between the border and domestic price for a good is 
less than TT, the (relatively) high TT will preclude any trade (Balcombe 
et al., 2007). Another consequence is that if the border price changes but 
the change is small enough such that the price gap is still less than TT, the 
domestic price will not change in response to the change in the border price. 
The transmission elasticity between the two prices will therefore be zero.
Empirical Studies
Tyers and Anderson (1992) compute transmission elasticities for changes in 
border prices (covering both world prices and exchange rates) to domestic 
producer prices for 30 countries/regions and 7 agricultural commodities 
(or commodity groups) over 1961-83, for both the short and long run. The 
weighted average of the transmission elasticity for U.S. agriculture is 0.7 
in the short run and 0.78 in the long run. Compared with results for other 
countries in the study, the U.S. transmission is strong. The weighted average 
of the transmission elasticity calculated for the 10 member countries of the 
European Community (later called the European Union, or EU) is 0.17 in 
the short run and 0.38 in the long run. The short- and long-run transmission 
elasticities for Japan are 0.24 and 0.47. For developing countries, Tyers and 
Anderson find that in the short run, most commodity/country transmission 
pairings have a price transmission elasticity less than 50 percent, and in many 
cases the elasticity is less than 25 percent. Although the transmission perfor-
mance for these countries is better in the long run, the elasticity values are 
still far below unity.
Quiroz and Soto (1995) compute an aggregate transmission elasticity for 
changes in agricultural world prices to domestic producer prices for 78 coun-
tries over 1966-91. They find that for the United States, 50 percent of world 
price changes are transmitted to domestic prices within 2 years. Although 
this result is not high in an absolute sense and is much lower than the trans-
mission estimates for the United States from Tyers and Anderson, for the 
Quiroz and Soto study the U.S. transmission elasticity is relatively high. 
Only 4 of the 78 countries in the study—Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
and Uruguay—have a better transmission record than does the United States, 
with half or more of a world price shock transmitted to domestic prices 
within 1 year.
Quiroz and Soto find that most European countries show no transmission 
between trade and domestic prices, even in the long run. The best European 
performers are the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain, which take 5-7 years 
to transmit 50 percent of a change in world prices to domestic prices. Quiroz 
and Soto find no evidence of transmission for Japan, even in the long run. For 
developing countries, Quiroz and Soto calculate that about one-third show no 
transmission even in the long run, while for the rest, the majority take at least 
5-7 years to transmit 50 percent of a world price shock to domestic prices.
Mundlak and Larson (1992) compute transmission elasticities for world 
prices and exchange rates separately for 58 countries over 1968-78. They find 
that not only the United States but also most countries (including developing 
countries) have high transmission, in most cases close to one. Yet, Quiroz 
and Soto argue that the high transmission found by Mundlak and Larson 17 
The Transmission of Exchange Rate Changes to Agricultural Prices / ERR-76  
Economic Research Service/USDA
might be a spurious result due to a serious methodological problem, which 
they correct in their own study.
Even if one discounts the results by Mundlak and Larson, the findings by 
Tyers and Anderson and Quiroz and Soto show that price and exchange rate 
transmission for U.S. agriculture has been relatively high. This result stems 
in part from the United States having good supporting agricultural infrastruc-
ture—physical, commercial, and institutional. Transmission would be even 
higher if not for the effects of the various agricultural support policies that 
have existed in the postwar period (discussed earlier), some of which insulate 
domestic prices from changes in world prices and exchange rates.
Of the three works examined, Quiroz and Soto come closest in their period 
of coverage (1966-91) to the present, and their study ends in 1991. During 
the last 15 years, the United States has been liberalizing its agricultural poli-
cies. The main change has been a move toward support policies decoupled 
from both prices and production decisions by farmers. The main new type of 
support policy involves direct payments by the Government to farmers inde-
pendent of prices and farmers’ production decisions on what and how much 
to produce (USDA, ERS, Farm and Commodity Policy Briefing Room). By 
not being linked to or affecting farmers’ market decisions, these payments 
do not impede price or exchange rate transmission. Thus, although certain 
policies have been retained that retard price transmission, such as the sugar 
program, if studies of the type done by Tyers and Anderson and Quiroz and 
Soto were done for the last 15 years, they would probably show higher trans-
mission for the Unites States than these works reveal.
The low transmission of European agriculture results mainly from policies 
(within the EU, but also followed by non-EU members, such as Norway 
and Switzerland) that strongly insulate domestic prices from world price 
and exchange rate fluctuations. Like the United States, the EU also has been 
liberalizing its agricultural support policies during the last 15 years. As 
mentioned earlier, in the mid-1990s, the EU began reducing intervention 
prices and eliminated variable levies, which are transmission precluding. 
Yet, intervention prices remain for various commodities, as do high tariffs, 
which continue to impede transmission strongly (Agra Europe). Quiroz and 
Soto find that the developed countries with the highest transmission (even 
exceeding that of the United States) are Canada, Australia, and New Zealand 
(as discussed earlier). These countries appear to combine infrastructure equal 
to that in the United States with policies that are less transmission retarding 
than U.S. policies.
In addition to Tyers and Anderson, Quiroz and Soto, and Mundlak and 
Larson, a number of other studies calculate transmission elasticities for 
developing countries and also find generally low transmission. Hazell et al. 
(1990) compute the transmission of changes in world prices for 22 devel-
oping countries and 15 commodities over 1961-87. They find that transmis-
sion of world price changes to the prices at which countries export goods 
is generally high, but transmission to domestic producer prices is quite 
low. Baffes and Gardner (2003) compute transmission between world and 
domestic prices for 8 developing countries and 10 commodities from 1970 
to the 1990s (the end year of the calculation varies by country). The results 
for Mexico, Chile, and Argentina show strong transmission, while those for 18 
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Columbia, Egypt, Ghana, Madagascar, and Indonesia show little or no trans-
mission. All the countries covered undertook major agricultural liberaliza-
tion reforms during the mid-1980s to early 1990s, and the study calculates 
the change in transmission after reform begins. In some cases, transmission 
improves after a reform effort is made, but for most commodity/country 
pairings, transmission does not increase. The authors conclude that despite 
apparent reforms, protectionist policies continue (though in less overt form). 
Even if policy allows more transmission, poor infrastructure could also 
impede it.
Sharma (2003) computes transmission between world and domestic prices 
for eight Asian countries for wheat, maize, and rice over 1990-99. Like 
Baffes and Gardner, Sharma examines transmission over a period of time 
when the countries considered were beginning to liberalize their agricultural 
support and trade policies. Yet, he also finds transmission not to be high in 
the short run. For his statistically significant results, the simple average of all 
shortrun transmission elasticities is 0.27. The simple average of all statisti-
cally significant longrun elasticities is considerably higher at 0.65.
During the last 20 years, many developing countries have liberalized their 
agricultural support and trade policies, to varying degrees. The studies by 
Tyers and Anderson, Quiroz and Soto, and Hazell, Jaramillo, and Williamson 
capture little or none of that reform effort. Although the work by Baffes and 
Gardner and Sharma cover some of the reform period for certain countries, 
they find little evidence of improved transmission. Nonetheless, as with 
transmission for the United States, one would expect transmission during the 
last 15-20 years for many developing countries to be higher to some degree 
than that during the years before the mid-1980s. At a minimum, one would 
expect the negative effect of policy on transmission to be reduced. Countries 
also might have made improvement in infrastructure. Yet, most developing 
countries continue to have weak agricultural market infrastructure, which is a 
major transmission impediment.
The Cause of Low Transmission  
for Developing Countries 
Is low transmission for developing countries the result of mainly govern-
ment policies or market conditions, in particular weak infrastructure?  The 
empirical studies on transmission presented earlier do not provide an answer, 
as they do not allow one to apportion the calculated levels of incomplete 
transmission by cause. It would be useful at least to determine empiri-
cally whether market conditions (especially weak infrastructure) can also 
contribute substantially to incomplete transmission.
Evidence regarding the impact of market conditions on price transmission is 
rather general but nonetheless revealing. Fackler and Goodwin (2001) and 
Barrett (2001) acknowledge that most empirical tests for agricultural markets 
reject the “law of one price.”  This “law” states that if one adjusts for the 
effects of market intervention policies and transport and transaction costs, 
then a product should have the same price everywhere within a country (or 
however one defines a market area). For traded goods, border prices should 
equal domestic prices. The failure of empirical tests to support the law of one 
price may stem from problems with measurement, especially of transport and 19 
The Transmission of Exchange Rate Changes to Agricultural Prices / ERR-76  
Economic Research Service/USDA
transaction costs, which usually are quite challenging to gauge (see the expe-
rience of Barrett concerning agricultural trade among Pacific Rim countries, 
2001, p. 21-22). Yet, the empirical results suggest that in addition to policies 
and transport and transaction costs, nonpolicy-related incomplete transmis-
sion could create gaps between border and domestic prices. 
Work by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) in computing producer support estimates (PSEs) can be used to 
provide more specific evidence of the effect of market conditions. The PSEs 
consist of two elements: budgetary transfers to producers and market price 
support (MPS), which results from policies that create a gap between border 
and domestic prices. In computing MPS for developing and transition econo-
mies, the OECD sets MPS equal to zero for a specific commodity/country 
pairing in the following situations, even if a gap exists between the border 
and domestic prices: (1) the good is exported, the domestic producer price is 
below the border price (in domestic currency), and no taxing policies can be 
identified (such as an export tax); and (2) the good is imported, the producer 
price is again below the border price, and some type of protection policy 
either can or cannot be identified (OECD, 2007). In the second case, even if 
a protection policy can be ascertained, because the domestic price is less than 
the border price, the negative price gap is not attributed to any policy.
In computing MPS, OECD adjusts for observable domestic transport and 
transaction costs. This means that if a price gap exists for a commodity that 
is given an MPS of zero, the price gap cannot be attributable to policies or 
observable transport and transaction costs. One can argue that by default, 
market conditions should be largely responsible for most of the gap. Some 
measurement error (especially concerning transport and transaction costs, 
product quality, and nonhomogeneity) could occur in OECD’s price gap 
calculations (as OECD admits). Nonetheless, the OECD-observed price gaps 
can serve at least as a rough measure of the degree to which market condi-
tions, including deficient infrastructure, maintain disparities between border 
and domestic prices, or alternatively, the degree to which market conditions 
impede transmission of changes in border prices (world prices or exchange 
rates) to domestic prices.
OECD has calculated PSEs for Brazil (OECD, 2005a) over the period 1995-
2004, China (OECD, 2005b) over 1993-2003, and South Africa (OECD, 
2006) over 1994-2003. The products for which OECD judges the MPS to be 
zero, in all or most years, are beef, pork, poultry, eggs, apples, and peanuts 
for China; beef, pork, poultry, sugarcane, and cotton for Brazil; and beef, 
pork, poultry, yellow maize, sunflowerseed, and groundnuts for South Africa. 
Given that for all three countries, the zero MPS commodities include the 
major meats (beef, pork, and poultry), the zero MPS commodities constitute 
a substantial fraction of the total value of these countries’ agricultural output.
Based on OECD’s MPS data for these commodities, domestic producer 
prices deviated from border prices for nonpolicy reasons on average by 24 
percent in Brazil, by 15 percent in China, and by 21 percent in South Africa. 
For each country, the figure is derived from a weighted average of the price 
gap for specific commodities (for which MPS = 0) computed within years, 
and is an unweighted average of the annual aggregate price gap over the 
period for which OECD computes PSEs. The results suggest that market 20 
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conditions can create gaps between border and domestic prices, which occur 
because transmission between the two prices is incomplete.10 China, Brazil, 
and South Africa are hardly the least developed countries in the developing 
world, and their agricultural infrastructures are probably superior to those in 
many other countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. In the least devel-
oped economies, price gaps could be higher, and price and exchange rate 
transmission correspondingly lower, than in these countries.
OECD acknowledges that weak infrastructure and other market coditions in 
developing and transition economies can cause incomplete transmission and 
price gaps. In its 2007 review (Annex A, p. 166) of agricultural policies in 
nonmember countries, OECD states
  . . . markets are characterized by various imperfections, while it takes 
time and cost for agents to react to new market signals. Therefore, 
market inertia creates price differentials independently of government 
price interventions. The degree of such non-policy “noise” increases 
in the case of non-OECD economies. Markets in these economies are 
characterized by underdeveloped physical infrastructure, poor infor-
mation and weak market institutions, which impede price arbitrage. 
These deficiencies are even more pronounced in the countries with 
large territories, like Brazil, China, or Russia, where natural vastness 
exacerbates the effects of weak market organization.
These results also support the argument that fluctuating exchange rates 
often combine with market conditions to create enduring gaps that poor 
infrastructure and other market imperfections prevent from quickly closing. 
Of these three countries, Brazil has the largest price gap and also a volatile 
exchange rate. China, on the other hand, has the smallest price gap. Because 
of its policy of pegging its currency (the yuan) to the U.S. dollar (followed 
throughout the period for which OECD computes PSEs), China has had the 
least potential for currency movements to cause price gaps. OECD (2007, 
Annex A, p. 166) also acknowledges the major role fluctuating exchange 
rates can play in creating price gaps:
  The majority of non-OECD economies went through periods of 
serious macroeconomic adjustments. Such adjustments—whether 
controlled or crisis—brought about shocks to relative prices. For 
example, macroeconomic reforms in Brazil, South Africa, and Russia 
were associated with massive exchange rate devaluations. Following 
the major reforms, all these countries saw additional currency shocks 
of varying intensity. The exchange rate devaluations pushed world 
prices, expressed in local currencies, above domestic price levels, 
and opened wide price gaps. Such abrupt and strong price disparities, 
emerging due to factors not related to agricultural policies, take time to 
dissipate and inevitably affect the measured price gaps.
10As discussed earlier, a situation 
could exist whereby the domestic 
transport and transaction costs for a 
good exceed the initial gap between 
the good’s border and domestic prices. 
The high transport and transaction costs 
would preclude any foreign trade. In 
addition, the price gap for such goods 
computed from OECD price data 
should be attributable to these costs, 
rather than to market conditions that 
impede price transmission. Yet, this 
point does not mar ERS’s calculations 
and interpretation of the price gaps 
for the zero MPS commodities for 
Brazil, China, and South Africa. For all 
the commodities and years for which 
OECD sets MPS equal to zero for these 
countries, the commodities were traded. 
This means that for each commod-
ity in the aggregate in each year, the 
condition that domestic transport and 
transaction costs exceeded the initial 
price gap did not hold.21 
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How Does Incomplete Transmission Affect 
Measures of Protection and Support?
Incomplete transmission of changes in world prices and exchange rates 
to domestic prices has implications for the interpretation of conventional 
measures of protection and support to agricultural producers and consumers. 
These measures include the nominal protection coefficient, nominal assis-
tance coefficient, and producer support estimate (see box, “Measures of 
Protection and Support”). The measures were created mainly to gauge the 
effect of policies on markets and producers and consumers, with the producer 
support estimate being conceived specifically to measure support to agri-
cultural producers. The measures all involve some sort of gap between the 
domestic price or value for a commodity and its border price or value. The 
price wedge is interpreted as a measure of the degree to which policies distort 
domestic prices, and thereby distort market incentives to produce, consume, 
and trade goods, as well as the degree to which producers and consumers are 
affected by the distortion.
Measures of Protection and Support
The  simplest  measure  is  the  nominal  protection  coefficient,  which  equals   
the  domestic  producer  price  for  a  good  divided  by  the  border  price.     
(The  Organisation  for  Economic  Development  and  Co-operation  (OECD), 
however,  calculates  this  coefficient  as  the  producer  price  plus  per  unit 
output  subsidies,  divided  by  the  border  price.)  The  nominal  rate  of   
protection is the protection coefficient, but with the border price subtracted from the   
domestic  price  in  the  numerator.  Another  measure  is  the  nominal  assistance   
coefficient.  This equals the domestic producer price plus per unit budget subsidies 
to producers, divided by the border price. This measure gives the full “incentive 
price” received by producers relative to the per unit revenue they would receive 
in the absence of any government support policies (the latter being simply the 
border price). The nominal rate of assistance is the assistance coefficient, but 
with the border price again subtracted from the domestic price in the numerator.
The  producer  support  estimate  (PSE)  for  a  country’s  agriculture  measures 
the  monetary  value  of  gross  transfers  from  consumers  and  taxpayers  to   
producers from policy measures that support agriculture.  It equals the value of output   
measured in domestic producer prices minus the value measured in border prices 
(the aggregate price gap), plus budget transfers (subsidies). The percent PSE 
is the value of the producer support estimate divided by the sum of the value of 
output measured in domestic producer prices and budget transfers. This measure 
gives the support producers receive from government policies, relative to the full 
revenue received by producers.  All these measures make an adjustment between 
the  domestic  and  border  price  for  domestic  transport  and  transaction  costs. 
Before  2007,  OECD  computed  not  only  the  aggregate  PSE  for  countries’   
agricultural  producers,  but  also  commodity-specific  PSEs.  In  2007,  however,   
it  discontinued  calculating  commodity-specific  PSEs.  The  move  toward   
noncommodity-specific direct payments by many countries, such as the United 
States  and  the  EU  region,  made  it  conceptually  inappropriate  to  attribute   
budget subsidies to specific products. OECD, however, continues to compute   
commodity-specific market price support, which is the difference between a good’s 
domestic and border prices.22 
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Deficient market conditions, and especially weak infrastructure, that impede 
price and exchange rate transmission can make it difficult for policymakers 
to interpret these measures. As discussed earlier, poor infrastructure can 
have two main effects—high transport and transaction costs and incom-
plete transmission between border and domestic prices. In computing and 
interpreting these measures of support, however, the convention has been to 
assume that weak infrastructure has only the first effect—transport and trans-
action costs.11 Under this assumption, any difference between domestic and 
border prices not attributable to policies is attributed to these costs, such that 
markets are always in equilibrium. The convenience of the assumption is that 
if transport and transaction costs are deducted, any remaining gap between 
border and domestic prices can be attributed exclusively to policies.
Implicit in the assumption is that market conditions alone (independent of 
policy) cannot impede transmission between border and domestic prices, 
such that no gap can exist between the two prices that cannot be attributed 
to either policies or transport and transaction costs. Yet, the previous section 
of the report provided evidence (based on work by OECD) that deficient 
market conditions in Brazil, China, and South Africa can cause incomplete 
transmission between border and domestic prices. If true for these countries, 
it is probably even more true for those developing economies with weaker 
agricultural infrastructure. The conclusion would be that nontrivial price gaps 
can exist for periods of time that cannot be attributed to either market inter-
vention policies or transport/transaction costs. This means that conventional 
measures of agricultural protection and support for developing economies 
must be interpreted with care, given that the interpretations could overstate 
the effects of policies in creating price gaps and distorting market incen-
tives.12 If governments misidentify the cause of price gaps as revealed  
by the measures, they might adopt inappropriate policies intended to  
eliminate the gaps. 
11An example of this attitude and 
approach is the guide by Tsakok (1990) 
on computing and using measures of 
agricultural protection, support, and 
comparative advantage. In the meth-
ods described for computing these 
measures, Tsakok assumes that the 
sole effect of deficient infrastructure is 
transport and transaction costs.
12OECD’s work in computing 
producer support estimates (PSEs) is in 
fact a major exception to the conven-
tion of assuming that weak infrastruc-
ture cannot cause any incomplete 
transmission. In its calculation of PSEs 
for the transition economies of the 
former Soviet bloc, and, more recently, 
developing economies, the OECD has 
consistently acknowledged that sizeable 
price gaps could result from incom-
plete transmission of changes in world 
prices, and especially exchange rates, 
to domestic prices, and where deficient 
infrastructure could be a major cause of 
the incomplete transmission, such that 
domestic markets are not in equilibrium 
(OECD 1998, p. 144; Melyukhina 
2003, pp. 125-126; World Bank and 
OECD 2004, pp. 77-78). As discussed 
earlier, when OECD computes the 
market price support (MPS) part of 
PSEs and a gap (adjusted for domes-
tic transport/transaction costs) exists 
between the domestic and border price 
for a good that cannot be attributed to 
any identifiable policy, OECD sets the 
good’s MPS equal to zero. Yet, if any 
policy can be found, OECD includes 
the entire calculated gap in the MPS.23 
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Conclusion
One of the main features of the globalization of the world economy during 
the last 20 years has been the move toward freer trade and greater integra-
tion of countries’ domestic markets into world markets, in agriculture as well 
as in other sectors. In the late 1980s, many developing countries liberalized 
their agricultural production and trade policies, while the collapse of the 
Soviet bloc resulted in those countries moving from closed planned econo-
mies to generally open market systems. The Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture contributed to the liberalization of agricultural trade and support 
policies, as it banned quotas and other quantitative trade restrictions and 
pushed for converting trade measures into tariffs.
For countries to maximize their volume of trade and the resulting welfare 
gains from trade, changes in the world prices for goods and exchange rates 
must be transmitted to the domestic prices faced by the countries’ producers 
and consumers. Trade liberalization eliminated many systemic and policy 
constraints to agricultural trade and market integration, and, more specifi-
cally, ended or reduced systemic and policy impediments to price and 
exchange rate transmission. However, many developing and transition  
economies suffer from a different type of impediment to transmission and 
market integration—deficient market conditions, such as weak market infra-
structure and market power held by large domestic producers. These condi-
tions cause gaps between domestic and world prices, and in so doing reduce 
these countries’ trade volumes and economic gains from trade.
The current Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations has been called 
the “development round” because a major goal is to help developing econo-
mies reap more of the gains from trade and integration into world markets, 
especially in agriculture. Within the round, developing countries have been 
pushing for developed countries to end policies that reduce world agricultural 
prices. Yet, for agricultural producers in developing countries to benefit from 
such policy changes, the rise in world prices must be transmitted to their 
domestic markets. If market conditions within developing countries inhibit 
the transmission of higher world prices to their domestic prices, they lower 
the gains the developing economies can receive from trade liberalization.
The surge in world agricultural and food prices from mid-2006 to mid-2008 
also demonstrates how developing countries might suffer if market condi-
tions impede price transmission. During this time, food prices faced by urban 
consumers in many developing countries rose substantially, indicating fairly 
strong transmission of world prices to consumer food prices. This effect 
stems from cities having good infrastructure for the inflow of food and other 
goods and for economic activity in general. Although consumers suffered 
from the price increases, agricultural producers within developing countries, 
many of whom are poor small plotholders, had an opportunity to benefit 
from the rising prices. Yet, weak and undeveloped rural and agricultural 
infrastructure within these countries might have reduced the price transmis-
sion and thereby the benefit these poor farmers actually received. The price 24 
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surge likely affected developing countries asymmetrically, in that their food 
consumers were hit hard, with little offsetting advantage of higher prices  
to farmers.
If market intervention policies are the main cause of incomplete transmis-
sion, governments have it within their power to improve transmission 
through policy reform. If the main cause of incomplete transmission is 
market imperfections such as market power or weak infrastructure, govern-
ments can adopt corrective policies, but progress can take long and be expen-
sive. Weak infrastructure is largely a problem of economic development, 
for which there is no quick solution. Yet, for many developing countries, 
improving market infrastructure and other market conditions may have more 
potential to improve price and exchange rate transmission and expand trade 
than reducing existing agricultural market intervention policies.25 
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